Nathaniel Noblin v. Randolph Corporation, J.L. Rarden, Lessee, Employer, et al. by unknown
I '1 '7 D 
,, " 
.... 
Record No. 2636 
In the 





RANDOLPH CORPORATION, J. L. RARDEN, 
LESSEE, EMPLOYER, ET AL. 
FROM TH E I N DUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF VIBGINIA, 
RULE 14. 
~5. NUMBER OF COPIES TO BE FILED AND DELIVERED TO (lpp og. 
mo CouNsEL. Twenty copies of each brief shall be filed with 
the clerk of the cour t, and at least two copies mailed or de, 
livered to opposing counsel on or before the day on which the 
brief is filed. 
~6. S1zE AND TYPE. BTiefs shall be p rinted in type not less 
in size than small pica, and shall be nine inches in length 
and six inches in width, so as to conform in dimensions to 
the printed records. The record number of the case shall be 
printed on all briefs. 
The for egoing is printed in small pica type for the inf orma-
tion of c01111sel. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
Court opens at 9 :30 a. m. ; Adjourns at 1 :00 p. m. 

INDEX TO PETITION 
(Record No. 2636) 
. Page 
Statement of the Case ................... .- . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 • 
Questions Involved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . -4* 
Assignments of Error ............................. ·. 5• · 
Argument . . ....................... ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5i11i 
First Assignment of Error ................ ~..... 5• 
Second Assignment of Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 23• 
Table of Citations 
Acts of General Assembly 1918-Sec. 12 .............. 5•, 7* 
Acts of General Assembly 1920-Sec. 12 ...... 7*, 8*, 1s•, 23*) 
Acts of General Assembly 1924-Sec. 12 .......... 7•, 16•, 18~ 
Acts of General Assembly 1932-Sec. 12. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7t11 
Acts of General Assembly 1936 ............ 23•, .8*, t9•, 1s• 
American Bank~ Trust Co. v. National Bank of Suffolk, 
196 S. E. 693, 170 Va. 169. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20"" 
Annotations,·A. L. R., Volumes 8, 67, 73, 98 ............ 27~ 
0. ~ 0. Ry. Co. v. Palm,er, 149 Va. 560, 573, 140 .S.. E. 831. 12• 
Corri,gan v. Stormant, 160 Va. 727, 170 S .. E .. 16 ......... 17~ 
Drape·r v. Commonwe,alth, 111 S. E·. 471; 132 Va. 648 .... 20" 
Gelbin. v. Metro Goldwyn, etc., Co., 24 N. Y. S. (2) 909 ... 2.2-. 
Galveston, etc., Ry. Co. v. Mallatt, 6 S. W. (2d) 432 (Tex.) 22#;: 
Humphrees v. Boxley Bros. Co., 146 Va. 91, 98, 135 S. E. 
890 • • • • • . . • • • • . • • . . • • • • • . . . • • • . . . . . • . • . . . . • . . . • 12~ 
]Jorsman v. Richmond F. ~P.R. Co., 155 Va. 934, 157 
, s. E. 158 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16* 
Kell71 v. Trehy, 133 Va. 160, 112 S. E. 757 .............. 20* 
Mangus v. McClelland, 22 S. E. 364, 93 Va .. 786 ......... 20"" 
N. <I; W. Ry. Co. v. Faris, 156Va. 205,157 S. E. 819 ...... 17* 
N. <t W. Ry. Co. v. White, 163 S. E. 530,158 Va. 243 ...... 17~ 
Swader v. Kansas Flour Mills Co., 176 Pac. 143 ........ 23* 
Solomam, v. Call, 159 Va. 625, 166 S. E. 467 ...... ~ . . . . . . 174lr 
Smith v. Virginia Ry. ~ Power Co., 144 Va. 169, 131 S. E. 
440 . • • ..•••....••.••..•......•.•........ 11 *, 12'"', 13:11: 
8outhern Ry. Co. v. United States Cas. Co., 136 Va. 475, 
118 S. E. 266 ................. : .............. 12•, 13~ 
8wift & Co. v. Wood, 49 .S. E. 643, 103 Va. 494 .......... 20"' 
Ty~er v. Evans, 156 Va. 576 ....................•..... 1711r 
ll IND:Q;, TO PETITION. 
· Page 
V. B. & P. Co. v. Mitchell, 167 S. :m. 424 ................ 17~ 
V. E. & P. Co. v. Mitchell, 159· Va. 855, 164 S. E. 800 .... 17* 
United Fidelity, etc., Co. Y. Bl1'1e Dia1nond, 161 Va. 373,, 
170 S. E·. 728 ..•.......•........... ·. . . . . . . . . . . . . 17* 
·workmen's Compensation A.ct, Sec.tion 30 (1938) ... 5*, 24*, 
I~ , 25•, 26· 
·Workmen's Compensation A.ct, Section 31 (1938) . . . . • • 24 ~ 
·workmen's Compensation ~ct, Section 82 (1~38) ... ·.5'\ 24•, 
- · · · · · · . 25•, 26~ 
.William~~on v. Wellman, 156 Va. 417, 158 S. E. 777 ......• 17• 
IN THE 
. Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. · 
Record No. 2636 
NATHANIEL NOBLIN 
ver,<;us 
RANDOLPH COR,PORA.TION, J. L. RA.~DEN, LE.SSEE, 
.. EMPLOYER, AND VIRGINIA. AUTO MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMP ANY, INSURER 
PETITION FOR APPEAL. 
To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of tlie 
· Supreme Court of Appeal8 of Tl irginia: · 
Your petitioI1;er, Nathaniel Noblin, respectfully represents 
that he, is a.ggrieved by a final order of the Industrial Qom-
mission of Virginia, entered on the 10th day of July, 1942, 
in a proceeding·, wherein your petitioner was claimant, and 
Randolph Corporation, J. L. Rarden, Lessee, Employer, and 
Virginia Auto Mutual Insurance Company, Insµrer, were de-
fendants. A transcript of the record in said cause. is sub-
mitted along with this petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CA.SE. 
Petitioner, Nathaniel Noblin, was on the night of Decem-
ber 25, 1940, arid for sometime prior thereto had been, in the 
· employ of the John Randolph Hotcl-J. L. Rarden, Lessee--
as bell boy, working from seven o'clock P. l\L to seven 
2• o'clock A. M. daily. *His duties were to operate the 
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elevator, clean up around the lobby of the. hotel, run 
errands generally, take guests to their rooms and, when neces-
sary, assist them in getting· to bed. 
On the night of the 25th· of December, 1940, shortly after 
midnight, petitioner, a colored ma.n, thirty-nine· years old, 
was directed bv the Clerk at the desk of the hotel to show Mr. 
William H. Lawson, Jr., a g'llest, who was under the influence 
of intoxicants, to his room. Petitioner, while acting in the 
course of his employment, proceeded to . take Mr. Lawson to 
his room. He did not at the time observe that there was 
anyt~ing· wrong with Mr. Lawson. Upon arriving in the room, 
Mr. Lawson sat on the edge of the bed and asked petitioner 
to untie his shoes. While petitioner was in the act of un-
tying Mr. Lawson's shoes, Mr. Lawson, whil_e under the in-
fluence of intoxicants, and without warning, suddenly kicked 
petitioner in his right eye, resulting in injuries, causing the 
removal of the right eye. Petitioner had taken Mr. Lawson 
to his room at the hotel-many times before and had never 
had any trouble with him. Petitioner, during childhood, sus. 
tained injuries to his left eye and was totally blind in that 
eye at the time of the aforesaid accident. 
On January 10, 1941: the employer filed a statement with 
. the Industrial Commission, setting forth the facts in connec-
tion with the injury, in support of an application of peti-
tioner for a.n award. There was fHed with the employer's 
statement and the petitioner's application the statement of 
the night clerk of the hotel, setting out the facts in connec-
3• tion with the injury; the ""statement of the physicians re-
lating to the nature and extent of the injury, and a state-
ment of the ·employer showing the average weekly earnings 
of petitioner. 
On the 3rd day of .July, 1941, the parties having been un-
able to reach an agreement as to the amount of compensa-
tion, petitioner signed a formal application for a hearing, 
which was filed with the Commission on 'July 7, 1941; the 
claim was thereupon placed on tbe hearing docket of the 
Commission, and formal notices of a hearing, fixed for the 
18th day of September, 1941, at Halifa.x, were mailed out to 
all parties in interest on August 16, 1941. In the meantime, 
prior to First August Rules, 1941, the employer took peti-
tioner to the office of F. C. Hedinger, Esquire, an attorney 
of Boydton, Virginia, and requested Mr. Hedinger to accept 
employment at the hands of petitioner to prosecute a suit fo'r 
damages against William H. Lawson, Jr., for the assault 
upon the petitioner by Lawson. Mr. H~dinger acceded to 
this request and :filed an action for damages in the Circuit 
Court of Halifax County against William H. Lawson, Jr., 
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in the name of petitioner, returnable to first August Rules. 
On · September 17, 1941, all parties were advised by the 
Industrial Commission that the hearing scheduled for Sep-
tember 18th, 1941, would be continued. Orn September 23rd, 
1941, in the Circuit Court of Halifax County, petitioner re-
covered of William H. Lawson, Jr., in the action aforesaid, 
judgment in ·the sum of two thousand dollars ($2,000.00), 
with interest and costs. Execution was issued on this judg- ' 
ment on October 4, 1941, delivered to the Sheriff of Halifax 
County and by him returned ''no effectSi liable oti<to levy." 
4~ The judgment is, in fact, uncollectable. 
On October 24, 1941, the Industrial Commission fixed 
~pon. November 8, 1941, for a hearing in the ease and advised 
all parties in interest accordingly. . 
On November 5, counsel for the employer filed with the 
Commission a sta.tement of the. employer;s grounds of de-
fense, among which is the following: 
''That the Claimant has recovered a judgment against Wm. 
H. Lawson, Jr., who caused his injury in the Circuit Court 
of Halifax County, Virg·inia, in the sum of $2,000.00, thus 
destroying the right of. subrogation existing in Randolph 
Corporation, and/or J. L. Rarden, lessee, and Virginia Auto 
Mutual Insurance Company, insurer.'' 
The defendant also pleaded as a defense that petitioner. 
had elected to pursue his remedy against William H. Lawson, 
Jr., and that such election barred him from a cc;>mpensatfon 
award. 
On the 19th day of !fay, 1942, Commissioner Deans, upon 
a hearing before him, sustained ~he foregoing defenses and 
denied an award, and the full Commission, upon review, af-
firmed the action of Commissioner Deans on July 10, 1942. 
QUESTIONS INVOLVED. 
There are two questions involved in the case: 
First, whether the judgment rendered in the civil a~tiou 
against the third party constitutes a ba.r to further pro-
ceedings before the Industrial Commission ·upon the 
5.._ claim for an •award; and · 
. Secondly, if petitioner is entitled to an award, whether 
Section 30 of· the Workmen's Compensation Act, relating to 
total incapacity, or Section 32, containing a schedule of rates 
for specific injuries, applies to the case. 
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The Industrial Commission decided both questions ad-
versely to petitioner. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
1. That the Commission erred in holding that the judg .. 
ment rendered in the ciyil action against the third party was 
a bar to further proceedings before the Commission for an 
award; and 
2. That the Commission erred in holding that should com-
pensation be allowed, the amount thereof should be according 
to the provisions of Section 32 of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion .Act, containing a schedule of rates for specific injuries, 
instead of according to the- provisions of Section 30, provid· 
ing compensation for total incapacity. 
ARGUllENT. 
First Assignment of Error. 
A Workmen's Compensation Aet was first adopted in Vir .. 
ginia by the General Assembly of 1918; Acts 1918, p. 637. 
Section· 12 of the Act of 1918 is as follows : 
6* •''The rights and remedies herein granted to an em-
ployee where h~ and his employer have accepted the 
provisions of this aet respectively to pay and accept com-
pen~ation on account of personal injury or death by acci-
dent shall exclude all other rig·hts and remedies of such em-
ployee, his personal representative, parents, dependents or 
next of kin, at common law or otherwise on account of su:ch 
injury, loss of service or death.'' 
This section wa.s amended in 1920, Acts 1920, p. 256; 1924, 
Acts 1924, p. 478; 1930, Acts 1930, p. 406; 1932, Acts 1932, 
pp. 485, 486, and in 1936, Acts 1936, p. 591. The amendment 
of ,section 12 in the Acts of 1920,: is as follows : 
'' The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee 
where he and his employer have accepted the provisions of 
this aet respectively to pay and accept compensation on ac- ~ 
count of personal injury or death by accident shall exclude~ 
all other rig·hts and remedies of such employee, his personal 
representativer parents,. dependents or next or kin, at com-
mou law or otherwise on account of such injury, loss of serv-
ice or death. 
'' The making of a lawful claim ag·ainst an employer for 
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oompensation under this aet for the injury or death of his 
employee shall operate as an assignment to the employer of_. 
any right to recover damages which the injured employee or 
his personal representative or other person may have against 
any other party for such injury or death, and such employer 
shall be subrogated to any such right and may enforce, in 
bis own name, or in the name Qf the_ injured employee or 
bis personal representative, the legal liability of such other 
'party. The amount of compensation paid by the employer 
-or the amount of compensation to which the injured employee· 
' or his dependents are entitled shall not be admissible as 
evidence in any action brought to recover damages, but any 
amount collected by the employer under the provisions of 
this section in excess of the amount paid by the e~ployer or 
f.or which he is liable shall be held by the employer for the 
benefit of the injured employee or other person entitled 
thereto, less such amounts as are paid by the employer for 
reasonable expenses and attorney's fees. Provided, that no 
compromise settlement shall be ma.de by the employer or in-
surance carrier in the exercise· of such right of subroga:.tfon 
without the approval of the Industrial commission and 
7* the injured employee or the *personal representative or 
dependents of th'e deceased employee being first had and 
obtained.- · 
t 'Where any employer is insured against liability for com-
pensation with any insurance carrier, and such insurance 
carrier shall have paid any compensation for which the em-
ployer is liable or shall have assumed the liability of the 
employer therefor,. it shall be subrogated to all the rights 
and duties of the employer, and may enforce a.ny such rights 
in its own name or in the name of the injured employee or 
his or her personal representative, provided, however, noth-
ing herein sha.ll be construed as ,conferring upon insura11ee 
carriers any other or further rights than those existing in the 
employer at the time of the injury to his employee,'anything 
~11 the policy of insurance to the contrary notwithstanding. 
· "Nothing in this act contained shall be construed to make, 
for the purposes of this act, the employees of an independent 
contractor the employees of the person or corporat~on em-
ploying or contracting with such independent contractor.'' 
It will be observed that neither Section 12 of the Acts of 
1918, nor Section 12 of the Acts of 1920, contains any provi~ 
siori whatsoever to the effect that the prosecution or an ac-
tion against the third party shall bar pfoceedings before the 
Industrial Commission for an award. Sueh a. provision w~s 
adopted for the first time in the amendment to Section 12, 
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found in the Acts of 1924. This provision was carried into· 
the amendments of Sec.tion 12 in 1930 and 1932. The provi-
sion thus found in the law from 1924 to 1932, is as follows : 
,,. * • where such employee, his personal representative 
or other person may have a right to recover damages 101·· 
.sv.ch injury, loss of service or death from any person o~ per-
sons other than such employer, he may institute an action at 
law ag·ainst such third person or persons before an award is 
made under this act and prosecaute the same to its :final de-
termination, -but either the acceptance of an award here-
s•. under, or the •procurement of a judgment. in an action 
at. law, shall be a bar to proceeding further with the 
alternate remedy; ,ft • • ' ' 
The amendment to Section 12, in 1936, omitted this pro-
vision. The 1936 amendment is merelv a reenactment of Sec-
tion 12, as it is found in the Acts of 1920, with the additional 
provision to the effect that if the employee sues the -third 
party, the..eourt. shall, upon the petition of the employer, as-
certain the amount of certain expenses incurred by the em-
_ployer under the provisions of the Act and require that the 
judgment debtor pay such expenses to the employer out of 
any judgment rendered in favor of the employee. 
In order to illustrate that the 1936 amendment is identi-
~al .with the 1920 act, excepting the insertion providing for 
' the payment of expenses of medical attention, etc., in the 
event of the action by the employee against the third party, 
we submit here a copy of the two acts in parallel columns. 
The new part in 19·36 amendment is italicized. 
1920 Act 
''The rights and remedies 
herein granted to an em-
ployee where he and his em-
ployer have accepted the pro-
visions of · this aot respec-
tively to pay and accept com-
pensation on account of per-
sonal injury or death by acci-
dent, shall exclude all other 
rig·hts and remedies of such 
employee, his personal rept·e-
sentative, parents, depend-
ents or next of kin, at com-
1936 Act 
''The rights and remedies 
herein granted to an em-
ployee where he and his em-
ployer have accepted the pro-
visions of this act respec-
tively to pay and aceept com-
pensation on account of per-
sonal injury or death by a~i-
dent shall exclude all other 
rights and remedies of such 
employee, his personal repre-
sentative, parents, depend-
ents, or next of kin, at com-
t 
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mon law or otherwise on ac-
. count of such injury, loss of 
· .service or death. 
''The making of a lawful 
claim against . an em-
9* ployer for *oompensa-
tion under this act for 
the injury or death of. his em-
ployee shall operate as an as-
s~gnment to the employer of 
any right to recover damages 
which the injured employee 
or his personal representa-
tive or other person may 
have against any other pady 
for such injury or death, and 
such employer shall be sub'"" 
rogated to any such right and 
" may enforce, in his own _name, 
or in the name of the injured 
employee or his personal rep-
resentative, the legal lia-
bility of such other party. 
The amount of .compensation 
· paid iby the employen or the 
amount of compe}?.sation to 
· which the injured employee 
or his. dependents are en-
titled shall not be admissible 
as evidence in any action 
brought to recover damages, 
but any amount ·collected by 
the employer under the pro-
, visions of this section in ex-
cess of the amount paid by 
the employer or for which he 
is liable shall be held by the 
employer for the benefit of 
the injured employee or 
other person entitled thereto, 
less such amounts as a.re paid 
by the employer for reason-
able expenses and attorney's 
fees. Provided, that no com-
promise settlement shall be 
mon law ·or otherwise on ac-
count of. s.uch injury, loss of 
service or death. 
h The making of a. lawful 
claim against an ·employer 
for compensation under this 
aet for the injur:y or death of 
his employer shall operate a.s 
an assig'llment to the em-
ployer of any right to re,. 
cover damages which the in-
jured employee or 1 his per-
sonal representative or othe:r. 
person may have against any 
other party for such injury 
or death, and such employer 
shall be subrogated to Rny 
such right and may enforce, 
in his own name, or in the 
name of the injured employee 
or bis personal representa.-
tive, the legal liahility of such 
other party. The amount of 
compensation paid by the em-
ployer or the amount of com-
pensation to which the in-
jured employee or. his depend~ 
ents are entitled shall not be 
admissible as evidence in any 
action brought to recover 
damages, but any amount col-
lected by the employer under 
the provisions of this section 
in excess of the amount pa id 
by the employer or for which 
he is liable shall be held by 
the employer for the benefit 
of the injured employee or 
other person entitled thereio; 
less ~uch amounts a.s are paid 
by the employer for reason-
able expenses and attorney's 
fees. Provided, that no com-
promise settlement shall be 
made by the employer or in-
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made by tl1e employer or in-
surance carrier in the exer-
cise of such right of su.broga-
tion without the approval of 
the industrial commis_sion 
and the injured employee or 
the personal representative 
or dependents of the deceased 
employee being first had· and 
obtained. 
"Where any employer is 
insured against liability 
10* for •compensation '\\ith 
any insurance carrier, 
and such insurance carrier 
shall have paid any compen-
sation for which the employer 
is liable or shall have as-
sumed the liability of the em-
ployer therefor, it shall be 
subrogated to all the rights 
and duties of the employer, 
and .may enforce any such 
rights in its own name or in 
the name of the injured em-· 
ployee or his or her personal 
representative, provided, 
however, nothing herein shall 
be construed as conferring 
upon insurance carriers any 
other or further rights than 
those existing in the employer 
at the time of the injury to 
his employee, anything in the 
policy of insurance to the con-
trary notwithstanding. 
surance carrier in' the exer-
tion without the approval of 
cisP of such right of subroga-
the Industrial Commission 
and the injured employee or 
the personal representative 
or dependents of the deceased 
employee being first had and 
obtained. 
'' Where any employer is 
· insured against liability for 
compensation with any insur-
ance carrier, and such immr-
ance carrier shall have paid 
any compensation for whioh 
the employer is liable or shall 
have assumed the liability of 
the employer the ref or, it shall 
be subrogated to all the 
rights and duties of the em-
ployer, and may enforce any 
such rights in its own name 
or in the name of the in:jured 
employee or his or her per-
sonal representative, pro~ 
vided, however, nothing here-
in shall be construed as con-
f erriug upon insurance car-
riers anv other or. further 
rights than those· existing in 
the employer a.t the time of 
the injury to his employee, 
anything in the policy of in-
surance to the contrarv not-
withstanding. .. 
''In any such action by s1tch 
em,ploYee, his personal repre-
sentative or other persM1, 
against any person other tha·n 
the employer, the court 's"'/µ,ll, 
on petition or motion of the 
employer at any time p1rfor to 
1.,erdict, ascertain, the amount 
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' .. 
''Nothing. in this act con-
tained shall be construed to 
- ·make, for the purposes of this 
act, the employees of an 
11 • *independent contractor 
the employees of the 
person or corporation em-
ploying or contracting with 
such independent contrac-
tor.'' 
of expenses for ,,nedical, s~t't-. 
gical and hospital attP.ntion 
amd snpplies, and funerr;,l ex-
penses incurred by the em-
ployer itn.der the provi,<:irm,s 
of this act, and in. event of 
judgment against such per-
son other than the employe·r, 
the court shall in its order 
require that the judgment 
debtor pay such expense of 
the employer so asce·rta:ined 
by the co_urt ou.t of the 
mnownt of the ji,,cl,qment, so 
far as sit/ficien,t, and the bal-
ance, if any, to the jud,qment 
creditor. 
''Nothing in this act con- , 
tained shall be construed to 
make, for the purposes of this 
act, the employees of an in-
dependent contractor the em-
ployees of the person or cor-
poration employing or con-
tracting with such independ-
ent contractor." 
The italicized part of the 1936 Act opposite the blank 
space in the column containing· the 1920 Act is the new part 
which was added to the 1920 Act when it was reenacted in 
1936. The :first clause of Section 12 of the 1920 .Act, accord-
ing to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, in Smith v. Virginia 
Railway cf: Power Co., 144 Va. 169, 131 S. E·. 440, refers only 
to the remedy of an employee against his employer, and it 
is only his right to sue his employer fo! damages which is 
barred by the acceptance of compensat10n under the Act. 
The court said: 
'' The next clause of the section quoted refers to an en-
tirely different rig·ht, and subrogates the employer who has 
paid compensation to his employee under the act to the right 
to enforce any legal lia•bility against such other party as 
mav be liable in damages for the injury. The employer is 
nof only subrogated to any such right of the employee to 
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enforce any such legal liability against 3snother, _but the stat-
ute in express terms provid~s that he may enforce it 'in his 
own name or in the name of the injured employee, or his 
personal representative.' '' 
Where an employer is insured against liability for com-
pensation with an insurance carrier, the right of subrogatio11 
existing· in the employer does not pass to the carrier until 
the carrier has paid the compensation for which the employer 
is liable or has assumed the liability of the employ~r for such 
compensation. The third paragTaph of Section 12 expressly 
so provides, and even where the insuranc.e carrier has paicl_ 
the compensation, or assumed the liability therefor, the 
12*' right of subrog·ation *does not confer upon the carrier 
any rights other than those existing in the employer 
at the time of the injury to the employee. In other words, 
the insurance carrier, upon payment of the compensation, 
or assuming liability therefor, is placed in the position of 
the employer. The carrier's position is not one whit better 
than that of the employer, even though it has paid the com-
pensation, or assumed the lia!bility therefor. In this case, 
the carrier has done neither. 
·The amendment of 1920 was construed by the following 
cases: · 
Southern Ry. Co. v. United States Oas. Co. 1 136 Va. 475, 
118 S. E. 266. 
Smith v. V gn. Ry. Co., 144 Va. 169, 131 S. E. 440. 
Hum.phrees v. Boxley Bros. Co., 146 Va. 9·1, 98, 135 S. Ei. 
~Q ' 
C. & 0. By. Co. v. Palmer, 149 Va. 560, 573, 140 S. E·. 831. 
These cases hold that an employee who has accepted an 
award under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation 
.A.ct may nevertheless sue a third party who causes his in-
jury. Illustrative of the holdings in these cases is the opinion 
of Mr. Justice Holt in G. <t 0. Ry. Co. v. Pal,mer, where it is 
said: 
'' Into the construction of every act must be read the pur-
pose of the Legislature, and that m;1.derlying purpose in this 
instance was to give relief to workmen. This relief in the 
nature of things had to be charged ag·ainst the employer. 
Sootion 12 in the original act of 1918 (Acts 1918, c. 400) con-
sisted only of what is now the first paragraph of that sec-
tion, as amended by the act of 1920. It said that an em-
ployee who had received compensation under this act from 
Nathaniel Noblin v. Randolph Corporation, et al. 11 
· his employer should not thereafter sue him-a declaration 
manifestly· just. 
13'* •" It soon became apparent that an employer might 
. be mulcted in compensation who was nowise at fault. 
The rig·ht of the employee to sue the wrongdoer had not 
been affected, and it was then possible for llim to duplicate 
his recovery and to secure damages from · two sources. Such 
a situation' called for relief, it was given in the amendment 
in 1920, and written into the second paragTaph of section 12. 
It gnve to the.employer the right to recover from the wrong-
doer what ever he l1ad actually had to pay, and it took from 
the employee the right pro tanto to a double recovery, but 
beyond this it left the employee's right to recover as it was 
, before. 
''For convenience, ancl for the protection of the employer,, 
and for the proper distribution of the. recovery, it provided 
that one action should be brought, and that by the employer. 
All this was for his benefit, and, if he does not care to avail 
himself of it, well and good, but he cannot in sucli manner, 
shut out the employee. * * 8 
''The third paragraph of section 12 as amended merely 
subrog-ates the insurance carrier to the rights of the con-
tractor. Such as they are it takes, and it takes neither more 
nor less. 
'' The purpose of these amendments, and their onlv pur-
pose, was to put the saddle on the right horse.'' .. 
This case followed the views expressed 'in Southern Ra,il-
1way Co. v. United States Casu,alty Co., supra, Smith v. V gn. 
Ry .. ct Power Co., supra, and Hurnphrees v. Boxley Bros. Co., 
si1,ipra. In Sni.ith v. Va. Ry. <I; Power Co., Prentis, P., ex-
pressed the opinion of the court in strong terms. We quote : 
"The contention is that Stratton could not maintain the 
action because of the fi-rst clause of section 12 of the act, 
hereinbefore quoted. That clause, however, refers only to 
the remedy .Qf an employee against his employer, and it is 1 
onlv his right to sue l1is employer for damages which is 
barred by the acceptance of compensation under this act. 
No argument to support this conclusion is necessary, as it 
seems '""'to us, because he who runs may read it in the statute. 
i' The next clause of the section quoted refers to an en-
tirely different rig·ht, and subrog·ates the *employer who 
14• has paid compensation to his employee under the act 
to the right to enforce any legal liability against such 
other party as may be liable in damages for the injury .. The 
employer is. not only subrogatecl to any such right of the 
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employee to enforce any such legal liability ag·ainst another, 
but the statute in express terms provides that he may en-
force it 'in his own name or in the name of the injured em-
ployee, or his personal representative.' 
"The citation of other cases relating to actions: in the name 
of one party for the benefit of another affords little aid, be-, 
cause the determination of the question here raised depends 
upon the construction of this partieular statute. The pur-
pose is so clearly expressed in the statute that we find 01;1r-
selves unable to appreciate the contention. This action can 
be maintained because the power of the state to authorize 
it cannot be doubted, and by the language used this power 
has been exercised. That wl1ic.h is manifest certainly re-
quires no demonstration. It is so evident from our own 
statute that such an action against a third person may be 
brought either in the name of ~he injured employee or in 
the name of the employer that we do not think it necessary 
to review the cases from other jurisdictions in whieh such 
questions have been raised. Among these are Lou1e v. 
Mor.(Jatn/s Louisiama cf T. R. db S. S. Co., 150 La. 29, 90 So: .. 
429; Mmwaster v. Graham Ice Cream Co., 103 Neb. 379, 172 
N. W. 52; Thomas v. Otis Elevator Go., 103 Neb. 401, 172 N. 
W. 53; Lancaster v. Hunter (Tex. Civ. App.), 217! S. W. 765; 
Rall v. Soiithern Pacific Co., 40 Cal. App. 39, 180 P. 20; 
Gone.s v. Fishe1·, 286 Ill. 606, 122 N. E. 95, 19 A. L. R. 760. 
"We observe .that the Nebraska court, in Muncaster v. 
Graham Ice Cream Co., 103 Neb. 881, 172 N. "\V. 52, in up-
holding the rig·ht of the injured employee to maintain an ac-
tion against a third party, says: 
" 'Evidently the intent of the Legislature was not to limit 
an employee to the recovery only of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act; but when, as a matter of justice, the employee 
was entitled to recover a greater compensation than is pro-
vided for in the act, then he had the right to proceed under 
the provisions of section 365'9, and to recover as much as a 
jury would warrant for his damages and injuries, and, after 
so recovering, to deduct therefrom the necessary expenses 
which his employer had been to in paying out under the pro-
visions of the act.' 
''In Thomas v. Otis Elevator Co., 103 Neb. 401, 172 N. W. 
53, the court saicl this : 
15* *'' 'The first -complaint made is that the plaintiff had 
no right to bring· the action in his own name under 
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section 3659, Rev. St. 1913. In Mitncaster v. GrahOAn Ice 
Orea,nz. Co., (103 Neb. 379, 172 N. W. 52), it was decided that 
the statute did not take away the right of the employee to 
recover damages against a third person when the relation 
of master and servant does not exist; that the section Wa5 
designed for the protection of an employer who had paid 
the compensation; that, if the employer's right were pro-
tected, it was no concern of the negligent third party.' 
"The statute subrogating the employer to the rights of 
the employee was not enacted for the benefit of the neg·ligent 
third party; he has slight interest in it. He remains liable 
for the entire amount of such damages as may be lawfully 
'recovered of him. The most that he could possibly claim 
is that after judgment he would be interested in having the 
proper apportionment made between the employer who has 
paid the. compensation and the employee, if the recovery 
against him should exceed the amount paid to such employee 
under the Compensation Act. So, in this case, is was not 
necessarv to amend the notice of motion. Everv interest 
which th"'e defendant lmd would have been fully protected by 
indorsing the writ or the declaration with1 the statement that 
the action of Stratton was for the benefit of the Virginia 
Railway & Power Company, as its interest mig·ht. be shown. 
That this is the common and approved practice in this state 
is shown by several cases.'' 
In that case the action was brought in the name of Stratton, 
the injured employee, and after a year from the date of 
the institution of the action, he asked leave to amend his no-
tice of motion to show that it was brought for his benefit and 
the benefit of his employer, as their interests might appear. 
The lower court allowed the amendment and on the subject 
of the necessity of such an amendment, Judge Prentis said: 
'' The amendment which the court allowed, while not neces-
sary, may have been appropriate. It was only because the 
defendant directed attention to the statute, and that the 
16* Virginia Railway•'!.:& Power Company had been thereby 
subrogated to the rights of the plaintiff to the extent 
of th~ compensation which it had paid him, that the amend-
ment was allowed. This was not the institution of a new 
action and was germane. It follows from this tl1at the plea. 
of tbe statute of limitations was properly rejected. -
''We find no error in the procedure." 
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Section 12. of the Workmen's Compensation ·Act wa~ again 
amended in 1924. Acts 1924, p. 478. T'he 1924 Act provides, 
among other things, as follows : · ' 
''provided, however, that where such employee, his personal 
representative or other person may have a right to recover 
damages for such injury, loss of service or death from any 
person or persons otlier than such employer, he may insti-
tute an action at law against such third person or persons 
before an award is made under this act and prosecute the 
same to its final determination, but either the acceptance of 
, an award herewnder, or the proci1,rement of a judgment' i-n 
a-n action at law, sliaU be a bar to proceeding fi,.rther with 
the alternate remedY;'' ' 
U ncler this amenda tory act the court, speaking through 
1
Mr. Justice Browning, in H orsma;n. v. Richmond F. ~ P. R. 
Co., 155 Va. 934, 157 S. E. 158, properly held that an em-
ployee injured in the course of his employment by the neg-
ligence of a third party, could not sue the third party after 
having accepted an award from the Industrial Commission . 
. Ref erring to the· contrary decisions under the act prior to 
the amendment, Mr. Justice Browning said~ 
'' The plaintiff, to sustain his contention that the said rul-
ing of the court was erroneous, cited a number of cases from 
otlier states, but appeared to rely chiefly upon the case of 
8-m-ith v. Virginia Railway <t Power Co1npany, 144 Va. 169, 
131 S. E. 440, 442. The decision of the court in that case 
was based upon the statute as it then existed. It was con-
trolled by the provisions of section 12· of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act then in force and effect (Acts of-1920, p. 
17*' 256, c. 176). We have no criticism *of the decision. It 
· was patently ~ound ahd founded in good reason, but 
this statute was amended by the Aets of 19-24, c. 318." · 
Other cases under the amendment of 1924 followed the 
Horsman case. They are: N. ~ W. Ry. Co. v. Faris, 156 Va. 
205, 157 S. E. 819; Williamson v. Wellman, 156 Va. 417, 158 
IS. E. 777; N. & '.W. Ry. Co. v. White, 163 S. E·. 530, 158 Va. 
243; V. E. & P. Co. v. Mitchell, 159 Va. 855, 164 S. E. 800; 
Tyler v. E'l!ans, 156 Va. 576; 8olo1nan v. Call, 159 Va. 625, 
166 S. E. 467; V. E. & P .. Co. v. JJ1itchell, 167 S. E. 424; Cot·-
. rigClln v. Stormant, 160 Va. 727, 170 S. E. 16; Utnited Fidelity, 
etc., Go. v. Blue Diamond, 161 Va. 373, 170 S. E. 728. 
After the decision in the Horsman case, repeated efforts 
were ma.de to get the General Assembly to repeal so much 
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of the amendatory act. of 1924 as barred the third party ac-
tion. Finally, in order to accomplish this result, the Gen-
eral Assembly of 1936, repealed section 12 as it then existed 
and adopted in lieu thereof an act in the identical language 
of the Act of 1920 ( Acts 1936, p. 591), under which the court 
had several times held, as we have seen, that the third party 
action was not ibarred by the acceptance of an award frolll 
the Industrial Commission. The act of 1920 did not contain 
any provision designed to take care of expenses for medical, 
surgical and hospital attention supplied and funeral expenses 
incurred by the employer under the provisions of the act in 
the event of an action by the emploiee against the third party.-
A paragraph to this effect was, therefore, inserted in the 
Act of 1920, when it was reenacted in 1936. This para-1s• graph strengthens the •view taken by the court under 
the act as it passed in 1920, because it contemplates the 
filing of such an action and expressly provides that '' in any 
such action by such employee'' the court ma.y ascertain the 
amount of expenses for medical, surgi.cal and hospital atten-
tion, etc. 
It will be observed that in the case of Smith v. Va. Ry. ,d'; 
Power Co., s11,pra, the decision of the court, holding that the 
injured employee cou]d sue the third party notwithstanding 
the acceptance of an award, was based upon the act of 1920. 
It will be further o hserved that this decision was under re-
view in the Horsman case, the first case under the 1924 amend-
ment, which amended the statute so as to bar the third party 
action by the employee. Speaking of the decision in the 
Smith case, which was controlled by the provisions of the 
act of 1920, Mr. Justice Browning said : 
"We have no criticism of the decision. It w~ patently 
sound and founded in g·ood reason, but this statute was 
amended by the Acts of 1924, • • * '' 
He then proceeded to set out the amendment which con-
tro11ed the decision in the Horsman case. After thus setting 
out the 1924 amendment, Mr. Justice Browning said: 
"It will thus be seen that the law is esseniiallv different 
from what it was when the Smith v. Virginia Ry. & Po'Wer 
Co .• s1-1,pra, case was decided.'' 
If the decision in the Smith case was "patently sound and 
founded in g-ood reason,'' it is respectfully submitted that a 
decision directly to the contrary under the 1936 statute can-
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not be sound or founded on good reason. If the decision 
19• under the act of "1920, as it then stood, was sound, a 
fortiori it' is now sound in view of the insertion of the · 
paragraph contemplating an action by '' such employee ~ * • 
against any person other than the employer,'' and provid-
ing· in such event for medical expenses, etc. 
, vV e have seen that Judge Prentis said in the Smith case-
'' The contention is that Stratton could not maintain the 
action because of the first clause of section 12 of the act, 
hereinbefore quoted. That clause, however, refers only to 
the remedy of an employee ag~inst his employer, and it is 
only his right to sue his employer for damages which is 
barred by the acceptance of compensation under the act. No 
argument to support this con~lusion is necessary, as it seems 
to us, because he who runs may read it in the statute. • • * 
''The purpose is so clearly expressed in the statute that -
we find ourselves u,nable to appreciate the contention. This 
action can be maintained ·because the power of, the state to 
authorize iii cannot be doubted, and by the language used this 
power has been exercised. That which is manifest certainly 
requires no demonstration.'' 
It is a matter of common knowledge that the General As-
sembly of Virginia of 1936 was composed of many lawyers. 
With knowledge of the Smith case and other like decisions 
m1der the 1920 act, the Assembly expressly reenacted the 
1920 act, and in doing so, made a special provision for case~ 
where the employee sues a :(!erson other than his employer. 
Can there be any doubt that the intention of the Legislature 
was to adopt not only the 1920 act, but also the court~s ~on-
struction of that act in order to make absolutely certain that 
the injured employee should have his remedy against the 
third party notwithstanding the acceptance of an award from 
the Industrial Commission Y It is a f am.iliar rule of statutory 
construction that the adoption or reenactment of a stat-
20*. ute that has received judicial •construction, adopts the 
construction given it. Kelly v. Trehy, 133 Va. 160, 112 
S. E. 757; Mang'ltS v. McClelland, 22 S. E. 364, 93 Va .. 786; 
Swift & Co. v. tWood, 49 S. E. 643, 103 Va. 494; Draper v. 
Commonwealt4, 111 S. E. 471, 132 Va. 648; American Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Natio'Ylal Bank of Buffolk~ 196 S. E. 693', 170 
Va. 169. 
In the language of Mr. Justice Browning in the Horsman 
case, quoting Judge Prentis in the Smith case, ''that which 
is manifest certainly requires no demonstration." 
Aside from the question of the construction of the Act, a 
serious question arises here as to whether the employer, after 
Nathaniel Noblin v. Randolph Corporation, et al. 17 
taking petitioner to a lawyer and requesting the lawyer to 
sue the third party, can thereafter plead such a suit in bar 
of a proceeding thereto/ ore filed by the claimant before the 
Commission for compensation. · 
The agreed statement of facts in ~his case shows that this 
proceeding for compensation was filed before the Commis!... 
sion promptly following the injury and long before the third 
party action was instituted, and that while. the proceedi1ig 
was pend.ing and before an award was made, the. employer 
took the claimant to l\fr. Bedinger and· asked· Mr. Hedinger 
to accept employment at the hands of the claimant to insti-
tute and prosecute the third party action. Mr. Bedinger~ at 
the instance of the employer, did accept such· employment 
a~d did institute and prosecute the action and recovered 
judgment in the sum of two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) 
which . is uncollectable. In the meantime, the case be-
21 '* fore the Commission was *continued from time to time, 
no doubt at the instance of the employer. As soon as 
the judgment was recovered, the employer then pleaded the 
recovery of this judgment as a ba.r to further proceeding 
upon the claim before the Commission. 
· The mere statement of such a case should be sufficient to 
dispose of It. The statute expressly gives to the employer 
the right to proceed against the third party, either in the. 
employer's name or in the name of the employee. If the third 
party action instituted under the circumstances stated, in the 
name of the employee, was not the exercise by the employer of 
the privilege granted to him by the statute, then such con-
duct on the part of the employer was a rank fraud upon the 
employee and should not be countenanced in any court of 
justice. We do not believe that the employer intended to 
defraud the employee and, therefore, we ta~e the charitable 
view of the situation that the employer was merely exercis-
ing the privilege granted to him by the statute. If the court 
cannot take that view, then we insist that to permit the em-
ployer to thus take .ad':antage of his own act would consti-
tute a legal fraud upon the employee and would prevent the 
employer from pleading the third party action as a bar to 
the proceeding before the Commission. It should be borne 
in mind that the proceeding before the Commission, was in-
stituted :first. If such a proceeding can be defeated by the 
employer by getting the employee to file a third P.·arty ac-
tion as was done in this case, then every employer in every 
case of a third party action could defeat compensation. we 
do not believe that the law will permit the setting of 
22• such a ""trap for an unwary employee. 
In the ca.sc of Gelbin v. Metro Goldwyn, etc., Co., 24 
\1 
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N. Y. S. (2) 909, the claimant filed a claim for compensation 
and thereafter filed suit against the third party and recov-
ered a judgment, which turned out to 1be uncollectable. The 
insurance companv carrying the compensation insurance 
thereafter refused to pay. compensation upon the ground that 
the claimant had made an election to sue the third party and 
that she could not thereafter claim compensation payments. 
In disposing- of the question, the court said: 
"vVith this argument, I do not agree. Regardless of the 
question whether or not the amendment to S,ec. 29 of the 
"\V'orkmen's Compensation Law by Chapter 684 of the laws 
of 1937, permitting a claimant to sue a third party and also 
accept compensation, is retroactive so as to cover this case, 
this insurance carrier is not excused from paying compensa-
tion by the mere recovery of a judgment' by· the claimant. 
The judgment has not been satisfied and conceivably may 
never be satisfied nor can satisfaction of said judgment be 
enforced by any proceeding whatsoever at the present time 
in view of the pending bankruptcy proceedings. Assignment 
of claimant's judgment to the extent of compensation pay-
ments provides the Insnrance Carrier with the same pro-
tection which it argues is afforded to the claimant. At the 
same time this plan prevents the carrier from escaping its 
legal _liability.'' (Petitioner offered to assign the judgment 
in this case.) 
In Galveston, etc., Ry. Co. v. MaUatt, 6 S. vV. (2d) 432 (Tex.) 
it wa.s held- · 
"Under Workmen's Compensation Act (Vernon's Ann. 
Civ. St. 1925, arts. 830608309) injured employer is real bene-
ficiary in cases where damages exceed amount received by 
employee from indemnifying association, and in such case 
injured employee may, at request of indemnifying party, sue 
third person, causing· injury.'' 
23* •1t will be observecl that our court has held, as here-
tofore pointed out, that the claimant is the chief bene-
ficiary under Section 12 of the 1936 amendment now in force. 
It is a general principle, accepted everywhere, that when two 
pHrsons are jointly interested in a cause of action, either the 
person in whom the legal title exists, or the person in whom 
the beneficial interest is vested, may sue, unless there is some-
N~thaniel Noblin v. Randolph Corporation, et al. 19 
thing in the statute expressly to the contrary. There is no 
such provision in the present statute, and, as 12ointed out 
heretofore, the cases construing the 1920 Ac.t expressly hold 
that such an action may be filed by the employee. 
The case of Swacler v. Kansas Flour Mills Co., 176 Pac. 
143, may be helpful. While this case may not be directly in · 
point, it throws some lig·ht upon the subject. It was ex-
pressly provided there by statute that while the claimant 
might proceed against both the employer and the· wrongdoer,· 
he should not be entitled to recover both damages and com-
pensation, but it was held that in order to- bar compensation, 
the claimant must have actually collected money as damages 
and that the mere recovery of a judgment upon which nothing 
could be realized would not bar a proceeding for compensa-
tion. 
Second As.si,gnment of Error. 
There is involved in this assignment the amount of com-
pensation to be paid in the event of an award. 
24 * *This question is to be determined by a construction 
of Sections 30, 31 and 32 of' the Workmen's C:ompensa-
tion Act. For convenience, reference is made to these sec-
tions as they appear in the booklet entitled "THE VIR-
GINIA Vi!ORKME-N\~- COMPENSAT[ON ACT," with an-
notations, court decisions, construing the Act, and formal 
rules of the Industrial Commission, compiled by the Indus-
trial Commission, and printed in 19:38. The Sections ref erred 
to are as follows : 
'' Total Incapacity-Compensation Rates 
'' Sec. 30. Where the incapacity for work resulting from 
the injury is total, the employer shall pay, or cause to be paid, 
as hereinafter provided, to the injured employee during such 
total incapacity a weekly compensation equal to, fifty-five per 
centum of his average weekly wages, but not more than six-
teen dollars, nor less than six dollars a week; and in no 
case s11all the period covered by such compensation ibe greater 
than five hundred weeks, nor shall the total amount of all 
compensation exceed six thousand dollars. Acts 1920, p. 256; 
1924, p. 4 78; 1926, p. 7, and 1930, p. 57 ; 1938, p. 386.'' 
20 Supreme .Court of Appeal~ of Virginia 
''Partial Incapacity----Oompensation Rates 
'' Sec. 31. Except as otherwise provided in the next sec-
. tion hereafter, where the incapacity for work resulting from 
t:P,e injury is partial, the employer shall pay, or cause to be 
· paid, as hereinafter provided, to the injured employee dur-
·ing such incapacity a weekly compensation equal to fifty-five 
per centum of the difference between his average weekly 
wages ·before the injury and the aver.age weekly wages which 
he is able to earn thereafter, but not more than sixteen dol-
lars a week, and in no case shall the period covered · by such 
compensation be greater than three hundred weeks from the 
date of the· injury. In ease the partial incapacity begins af-
ter a period of total incapacity, the latter period shall be de-
ducted from the maximum period herein allowed for partial . 
incapacity. Acts 1930, p. 57; Acts 1938, p. 386.'' 
'' Schedule of Injuries-Rate and Period of Compensation 
'' Sec. 32. (l) In cases included by the following schedule 
the incapacity in each case shall be· deemed to continue 
25• for 8 the period specified, and the compensation so paid 
for such injury shall be as specified therein, and shall 
he in lieu of all other c.ompei1sation, to-wit : • * • 
'' (p) For the permanent total loss of the vision of an eye, 
fi.fty-five per centum of the average weekly wages during 
one hundred weeks; and for the permanent partial loss of 
the vision of an eye, the percentage of one hundred weeks 
equivalent to the percentage of the vision so permanently 
lost.'' * • • 
'' ( r) 'TIile loss of both hands, or both arms, or both feet, or 
both legs, or both eyes, or any two thereof, in the same acci- · 
dent, shall constitute total and permanent incapacity, to be 
compensa.ted according to the provisions of section thirty.'' 
The Industrial Commission decided this question upon the 
consideration of -Section 32 alone. It will be observed that 
Section 30 specifically p:r;ovides for the amount of compen-
sation to be paid in case of total incapacity, and the period 
0£ time over which compensation shall be paid. Under this 
Section, the petitioner being- totally incapacitated, is entitled 
to compensation for a period of five hundred (500) weeks. 
The section does not contain any provision as t9 the causes 
of the total incapacity, except, of course, such incapacity 1 
must have resulted from an industrial accident, for which 
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some compensation may be .allowed. In this case, petitioner 
lost one eye in his childhood. The other eye was sufficient to 
enable him to perform all of the duties incident to his em-
ployment. When the industrial accident in question deprived 
him of the other eve, it totallv incapacitated him· for his work 
and.his case comes under Section 30. Sect.ion 32 merely pro-
vides compensation for certain injuries and fixes the amount 
of compensation. This section merely provides that for the 
permanent total loss of the vision of one *eye, namely: 
26* fifty-five per centum of the average weekly wages dur-
ing one hundred weeks. The seotion then provides that 
the loss of both eves in the same accident shall constitute total 
and J?ermanent incapacity to be compensated .according to 
the provisions of Section 30. It will be noted that this pro-
vision relatin~.to the loss of both eves is contained in a olause 
which also fixes the compensation ·r or the loss of both hands 
or both .arms or both feet or both legs. In either case, the 
loss constitutes total and permanent incapacity. The object 
of these provisions in this seetion is merely to define what, 
constitutes total and permanent incapacity when such in-
ca.pacity results from the loss of any two of the members 
named in the section in the same accident. It has nothing to 
do with incapacity for work resulting from injury provided 
for in Section 30. '11his ·becom~s clear when we read the two 
sections in connection with 'Section . 31. That section pro-
vides that '' except as otherwise provided in the next section 
hereafter, whe.re the incapacity for work resulting from the 
injury is partial, the employer shall pay, or cause to be paid,'' 
etc. It is, therefore, perfectly clear that Section 32 not only 
provides rates for compensation for specific injuries, but 
the·se specific injuries are regarded as only partially inca-
pacitating the claimant, except where the injury consists of 
the loss of any two of the members mentioned in clause 
'' (r) '' of the section. In such a case, the specific injury which 
would otherwise constitute only partial incapacity, shall be 
considered as totally incapacitating the claimant. within the 
provisions of Section 30. The prevailing view seems to be 
to the effect that total incapacity may properly be pred.i- · 
27• cated upon the loss of some *member to a person who 
has already been deprived of another member. This 
identical question is copiously annotated in several of the 
volumes of the American Law Reports. The better view is 
that a claimant who bas previously lost one eye and is sub-
sequently deprived of the other is entitled to an award on the 
basis of total incapacity, notwithstanding the fact that the loss 
of the first eye did not result from any industrial accident. 
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The theory is that if a claimant has one good eye. at the time 
of ail -accident and was thoroughly competent to do his work, 
and tlte acc.id«mt took that eye from him, then the accident 
totally disabled him, and the case comes under the _total in-
capacity section of the -A.ct. 
In the annotations to the Workmen's Compensation A.ct, in 
the pamphlet ref erred to, we find the following: 
'' ( q) Loss of second eye by accident, where first eye al-
ready blind; Held, entitled to total incapacity. Hebron's Gase, 
142 N. E. 60; In re Brauconian, 223 :M:ass. 273, 111 N. E. 792; 
"/!lease v. Hughes Co. (Okla.), 244 Pac. 82, 4 Comp. Rev. 82; 
8'l1.perior Coal Co. v. Ind~ Com. (Ill.), 152 N. E. 535; Killisnoo 
Packing Co. v. Scott, 14 Fed. Rep. (2d) 86, 4 Comp. Rev. 677 
(U.S. Circuit Ct. A.pp.); Liptak v. Ind. Com. (Cal.), 251 Pac. 
635. 5 Comp. 248; [.n, re CQato, 41 R. I. 289~ 103 Atl. 833; 
Brooks v. Peerless Oil Oo., 146 La. 383, 83 1Sou. 663." 
See also the annotations on this subject in 8 A.. L. R., at 
pag-e 1324; 67 A.. L. R,. 794; 73 A.. L. R.., at page 706, and 98 
A. L. R., p. 734. . 
In view of the particular phraseology of the sections of 
the act to be construed in this connection, it is submitted that 
the construction which we place upon the act entitling a claim-
ant in such a case as this to compensation as for total in-
capacity, i~ in accordance with common sense and logi-
28• cal reasoning. Petitioner *lost one eye years before 
the accident. out of which these proceeding·s arose. He 
was left with one perfectly good eye. With this eye, he was 
able to perform all o_f the duties incident to his employment, 
and was thereby able to earn a living for himself and family. 
There is no evidence that the eve which he lost as a result 
of the injury here complained of was in any sense diseased. 
There is no evidence that he was not thoroughly competent 
to perform all of the duties incident to his work.· When that 
eye was taken from him, he was thereby totally incapacitated 
to follow any gainful occupation. In any event; he was· 
totally incapacitated to perform the duties of his employ-
ment. It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that his case 
comes under Section 30 .of the Workmen's Compensation Act 
and that petitioner is entitled to fifty-five per cent (55%) of 
his average weekly wages, for a period of five hundred (500) 
weeks, and not for a µ.eriod of one hundred weeks only . 
. Petitioner here states that he desires to be heard orallv 
(by counsel), in support of this petition. " 
Petitioner further states that a ·copy of this petition was 
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mailed to John G. May, Esquire, opposing counsel in the 
trial court on the 18 day of July, 1942-. 
Petitioner further states· that if a writ of error is awarded 
herei;n, he will adopt this petition as his opening brief. 
For the errors herein complained of, apparent upon the 
face of the record, petiti9ner prays that a writ of error from 
the said order of the Industrial Commission of Virginia 
29~ may be awarded to *him and that said order may be 
reversed and the case be remanded for further proceed-
ings in accordance with the law. 
And your petitioner will ever pray, etc. 
I 




I, Geo. E. Allen, ~ attorney-at-law, practicing in the Su-
preme Court of .Appeals of Virginia, do hereby certify that, 
in my opinion, the judgment in this case should be reviewed. 
Given under. my hand this 18 day of July, 1942. 
Received July 18, 1942. 
.Appeal allowed. Bond $300. 
7-29-42. 
Received July 29, 1942. 
GEO. E . .ALLEN, 
Attorney. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk . 
EDW. W. HUDGINS. 
M. B. W. 
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RECORD 
Nathaniel Noblin, Claimant 
. v.. 
Randolph Corporation, J. L. Rarden, Lessee, Employer, Vir-
. ginia.Au~o Mutual Insurance Co., Insurer. 
Claim No. 525567. 
May 19th, 1942. 
Claimant appeared in person. 
Mr. F. C. Bedinger, Attorney-at-Law, Boydton, Virginia, 
and Allen & Allen, Attorneys-at-Law, Mutual Building, Rich-
mond~ Virginia, for the Claimant. 
Tuck & Mitchell, Attorneys-at-Law, South Hill, Virginia, 
and May, Simpkins & Young, Attorneys-at-Law, Mutual Bldg., 
Richmond, Va., for the Insurance Carrier. 
Hearing before Commissioner Deans at South Boston, Vir-
ginia, on March 19th, 1942 .. 
Deans, Commissioner, rendered the opinion. 
This claim was originally set to be heard in Halifax County, 
where the accident occurred, but COlmsel representing all the 
parties of interest have filed an agreed statement of facts, 
which is as follows : 
''It is agTeed by and between counsel for the c1aimant and 
counsel for the employer that the following facts 
page 2 ~ shall be considered as having been duly proven in 
this case: 
''1. That the claimant, Nathaniel Noblin, was on the night 
of December 25th, 1940, and for sometime prior thereto had 
been, in the employ of the John Randolph Hotel-J. L. Rarden, 
Lessee-as bell boy, working from seven o'clock P. M. to 
seven o'clock A. M. daily; that his duties were to operate the 
elevator, clean up around the lobby of the hotel, run errands 
generally, take g·uests to their rooms and, when necessary, 
assist in g·etting them to bed. 
'' 2. That on the night of the 25th day of December, 1940, 
shortly after midnight, the claimant wa~ directed by the 
Clerk at the desk of the hotel to show Mr. William H. Law-
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son, Jr., a guest, who was under the influence of intoxicants, 
to his room; that claimant, while acting in the course of his 
employment, proceeded to take Mr. Lawson to his room; that 
claimant did not at the time ohserve that there was anything 
wrong with Mr. Lawson; that upon arriving in the rooni, Mr. · 
Lawson .sat on the edge of the bed and asked claimant to 
untie his shoes; that while the claimant was in the act of 
untying Mr. Lawson'R shoes, Mr. Lawson, while under the 
influence of intoxicants, and without warning·, suddenly kicked 
the claimant in his right eye, resulting in injuries, causing 
the removal of the eye; that the claimant had taken I\fr. Law-
son to his room at the hotel many times before and had never 
had any trouble with him. 
'' 3. That the claimant during· childhood sustained injuries 
to his left eye and was totally blind in that eye at the time 
of the afore said accident. 
"4. That under date of .January 10, 1941, the following 
statements were filed with the Industrial Commission: 
'' a. Statement of claimant, setting forth the facts 
page 3 ~ in connection with his injury. 
- ''b. 1Statement of E. H. Vaughan, night clerk of 
.John Randolph Hotel-. J. L. Rarden, Lessee-setting forth 
the facts in connection with the injury. 
"c. Statement of J. L. Rarden, lessee, setting forth the facts 
in connection with the injury. 
''d. Statement of Dr. Francis H. McGovern, relating to 
the nature and extent of Claimant's injury. 
"e. Statement of William R. Watkins, relating to the na-
ture and extent of claimant's injury. 
''f. Statement of J. L. Rarden, lessee, showing average, 
weekly earnings of claimant in the sum of $23.44. 
· ''5. That on the 3rd day of July, 1941, the parties having 
been unable to reach an agreement as to the amount of com-
pensation~ the claimant signed a formal application for a 
bearing which was filed with the C'ommission on July 7, 1941; 
the claim was thereupon placed on the hearing docket of the 
Commission, and formal notices of a hearing, fixed for the 
18th day of September, 1941, at Halifax, were mailed out to 
all parties in interest on Aug-ust 16th, 1941. 
"6. That the claimant, through his attorney, F. C. Bedi11ger, 
Esquire, of Boydton, Virginia, filed his aetion for damages 
against William H. Lawson, Jr., returnable to first August 
Rules, 1941. 
"7. That on September 17, 1941, all parties were advised 
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by the Industrial Commission that the hearing scheduled for 
September 18th, 1941, would. be continued. 
"8 .. That on September 23rd, 1941, in the Circuit Court of 
. Halifax County, Noblin recovered of William H. 
page 4 } Lawson, Jr., in his action aforesaid, judgment in the 
sum of $2,000.00, with interest and costs; that exe-
'.Cution was issued on said judgment on October 4, 1941, de-
livered to the Sheriff of Halifax Countv and by him returned 
'no effects liable to levy. ' .. ~ 
"9. That the judgment is uncollectable. · 
''10. That on October 24, 1941, the Industrial Commission 
:fixed upon November 8, 1941, for a hearing in the case and 
advised all parties in interest accordingly. 
"11. That on November 5, 1941, ,John G. May, Esquire, of 
counsel for the employer, wrote the Industrial Commission a 
letter which was received on November 6th, 1941, statmg the 
employer's defenses as follows: 
·' (1) That ·the claimant has recovered a judgment against 
Wm. H. Lawson, Jr., who caused his iujurv, in the Circuit 
Court of Halifax County, Virginia, in the s11m of $2,000.00, 
thus destroying th~ right of subrogation existing· in Ran-
'dolph Corporation, and/or J. L. Rarden, lessee, and Virginia 
Auto· Mutual Insurance Company, insurer. 
'' ( 2) The average weekly wage of the claimant was not 
$23.50, as set out 'in his application, but $16.50. 
'' (3) If the plaintiff is entitled to compensation at all, 
which is denied, he is limited to 100 . weeks as provided for 
in the loss of an eye. 
'' 12. That the defendant may also defend this case upon 
the ground that the plaintiff has elected to pursue his remedy 
against William H. Lawson, Jr., and that such election bars 
him from a compensation award against the defendant. 
"13. T!hat the claimant is a colored man 39 years of age. 
'' 14. That no award has vet been made the claim-
page 5 } ant by the Industrial Commission, but if the Com-
mission should decide that the claimant is entitled 
to an award, that the same i:pay be ba~ed upon an average 
weekly wage of $20.00. 
''15. That the plaintiff was recommended to Mr. Redinger 
by J. L. Rarden who took him to the office of Mr. Beclinger to 
bring the parties together, and who requested that Mr. Bed-
inger accept employment at the hands of the claimant if he, 
Mr. Bedinger, thought the case of sufficient meritJ and that 
by virtue of this introduction and request Mr. Bedinger was 
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employed to represent the plaintiff in the action against Law-
son.'' · 
lt,or the record the statements filed with the Commission 
a~·e as follows : 
Statement of claimant, setting forth the facts in connection 
with his 'injury is as follows: 
NATHANIEL NOBLIN, 
age 39, employed by John Randolph Hotel, residing at South 
Boston, Va., states : 
'' On the morning of December 26, 1940, I was on duty at 
the John Randolph Hotel when I met with an accident. I am 
employed as Bellboy ttnd my hours of employment are from 
seven P. M. to seven A. M. After midnight there is only one 
boy on duty. As Bellboy I run the elevator, clean up, around 
the lobby, run errands, room guests, and; when necessary, 
help put them to ·bed. 
'' At·ahout·2 :15 A. M. on the 26th I g·ot a bell from the clerk, 
Mr. Vaugl1an, and stopped my cleaning up and went 
page .6 ~ to the desk. Mr. ·wm. H. Lawson, Jr. had gotten 
a room and Mr. Vaughan asked me to show him to 
it I didn't pay much attention to him and didn't notice that 
anything was wrong· with him. We got on the elevator and 
when we went to get off I saw that he, misjudged his step and_ 
lost his balance a little. 
'' I could tell that he had had a drink or two, but I didn't 
think that he was drunk. When we got in his room I helped 
Mm take off his coat, after which he sat on the edge of the 
·bed for me to untie his shoes. I was stooping down untying 
his shoes when he kicked me in the eye. 
'' '11his was done without any warning and I don't know 
whether 'it was intentional or not. All this while I had not 
said anything to Mr. Lawson, and he had not said a cross 
word to me. I was suffering: so that I don't exactlv know 
what happened next. In a little while Mr. Inge led nie down 
stairs where I was seen by Dr. Watkins. I was taken to the 
Danville Hospital. 
"I have roomed Mr. La:wson many times and never had any 
trouble with him. At the hospital my right eye was removed. 
·when I was a little boy I lost the sight of my left eye when 
struck by a baseball. I can only see light out of it. I don't 
know how Mr. Lawson happened to kick me in the eye. 
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1Jfr. E. H. V aitghan. 
''I have heard the above statement read to me and it is 
· correct.'' 
Statement of E. H. Vaughan, night clerk of John Randolph 
;Hotel-J. L. Rarden, Lessee-setting forth the facts in con-
nection with the injury is as follows : 
. MR. E. H. VAUGHAN, 
employed as night clerk at the John Randolph Hotel, 
page 7} residing at South Boston, Va., states: 
'' On the night of Dec.ember 25th, 1940, I came on duty a 
little before eleven o'clock. Nathaniel Noblin was the bel1-
boy on duty that night. He came on at seven o'clock and 
was to work until seven the next morning. At about two-
·:fifteen o'clock in the m~rning of the 26th a Mr. William H. 
Lawson, Jr. came into the hotel to get a room for the 'night. 
I could tell that he had. been drinking rather heavily but did 
not notjce him staggering any when he walked up to the d~sk. 
He asked me for a room and asked if he had any credit here. 
I told him 'not tonight.' He then threw a five dollar· bill on 
the desk and I gave him $3.50 change. 
'' He could hardly ·write his name on the register-just 
scratched it. He took the change, crumpled up in his fist 
and as he started to leave the desk he seemed to loi;;e his 
balance and started falling backwards across the. lobby. He 
fell back towards a chair and fell down in it. In a moment 
or so he got upi by himself and I told Noblin to take him up 
to llis room. I had given him Room 3.26. Noblin did not 
have to assist Mr. Lawson to the elevator. 
"At two-twenty-five it is customary for Noblin to take the 
mail to the train and when he did not show up I rang the 
elevator bell for him. A.t about this time I heard somebody 
·making a crying nois(l, but I didn't pay much attention to it. 
I thought it· might be- Mr. Lawson who had hurt himself a 
little, he was so drunk. In a few minutes a Mr. Inge, a guest, 
came to the head of the stairs and asked me what the crying 
was, and I told him I didn't know. I couldn't leave . 
page 8 r the desk, as ther~ was nobody else to watch it, and 
. I expected Nobhn back every moment. In a few 
minutes Mr. Inge came down leading Noblin who was crying 
. and who said that his only good eye was· gone now. I called 
· Dr. Watkins and the police· and when the police came they 
found Mr. Lawson fully dressed.sitting clown by the elevator, 
which was on the 3rd floor. I clicl not hear Mr. Lawson say 
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anything about the accident. The police took him away.· 
"Noblin said that he was helping to.get Mr. Lawson in bed 
and was kneeling down on the floor untying his shoes when 
the accident happened. He said that Mr. Lawson either hit 
him with his fist or picked UJ? something and hit him. He 
also said that he was ·beating hrm in the back all the way down 
the hal11 after he was struck in the eye. Noblin, I understand 
later, said that he was kicked in the eye. He was 1n such 
pain that night that. I doubt if he knew. what he was saying. 
''Noblin 's duties here are various. He runs the elevator, · 
is bellboy, carries mail to the train, runs errands and is gen-
eral handyman around the hotel. He was the only boy on 
duty at this time. It is customary for the bellboy to help 
in putting guests to bed whenever it is necessary. I have 
never heard Noblin talk back to a guest. He is very polite 
and mildmannered. Mr. Lawson talked sarcastic. this night 
and acted like he was trying to pick a fuss.'' 
Statement of 
J. L. RARDEN, 
lessee, setting forth the facts in connection with the injury is 
as follows: 
page 9 ~ "Nathaniel Noblin is employed by the John ·Ran-
dolph Hotel as Bellboy. At the time of his injury, 
he was on night duty. He came on at seven P. M. and worked 
until seven in the mornin2". 
"Mr. E. H. Vaughan was the night clerk in charge at the 
time of the accident. Noblin 's duties as bellboy are varied. 
He runs the elevator, carries. baggage, runs errands and is · 
general handyman around the hotel. 
"It is customary for the bellboy to help put guests to bed 
when.it is necessary.'' 
The medical reports of Drs. Francis H. McGovern and Wil-
liam R. Watkins, designated as ''d and e", are not herein re-
cited due to the fact that their statements show the physical 
disability is indicated in the other recitals. 
It is, the ref ore, found that there was an accident which 
arose out of and in the course of the· employment of the Ran-
dolph Corporation, with an average weekly wage of $20.00. 
The questions involved are two, to:-wit: . 
1. The amount of compensation to be paid should it be al-
lowed, and 
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2. Whether the claim against the Randolph Corporation 
is barred clue to the action on the part of the employee to pur-
sue. his remedy against the third party by civil notion. 
- Considering the first question, it is found that should com-
pensation be allowed, the ~mployee is entitled to one hundred 
weeks at fifty-five per cent of the average weekly wage. 
Reference is made to Section 32, sub-sections 
page 10 ~ (p) and ( r) which read as follows: 
'' (p) F.or the permanent total loss of the vision of an eye, 
fifty-five per centum of the average weekly wa~es during one 
hundred weeks; and for the permanent partial loss of the 
vision of an eye, the percentage of one hundred weeks equiva-
lent to the percentage of the vision so permanently lost.,., 
'' ( r) The loss of both hands, or both arms, or both feet, or 
· both legs, or both eyes, or any two thereof, in the same ncci- · 
dent, shall constitute total and permanent incapacity, to be 
compensated according to the provisions of section thirty.'' 
Prior to the Acts of the As.sembly 1934, page 39, there would 
be cause for some consideration of the question of total dis-: 
ability, which to that time had not come before the Industrial 
Commission for determination. Since that time, Sub-section. 
(r) clearly makes the extent limited to "in the same accident'' 
, or to the left eye. 
The amendment thus made was drawn by me and presented 
to members of the Legislature to meet the end herein indi-
cated, which gave an opportunity to employees with a '' lost 
member'' to obtain an occupation which at that time was 
closed to them. Able counsel refers to the annotations of 
1938 issued by the Industrial Commission but by a scrutiny of 
same, shows that clear reference is made to court decisions 
of other states who have not the provision "in the same ac-
cident'' and also. no decision of this Commission in conflict 
with. the views herein expressed, based upon s·aid amendment 
of 1934. 
Considering question 2, to-wit: Whether the 
page 11 ~ claim against the Randolph Corporation is barred 
. due to the action on the part of the employee to 
pursue his remedy against the third party by civil action. 
The decision here is that the claimant is barred bv his action 
and the claim is the ref ore dismissed. .. 
This brings us to a consideration of our Section 12 of the 
Workmen's Cqmpensation Act. The many amendments. to 
the original Act show changes by Acts 1920, p. 256; 1924, page 
478; 1930, page 405; 1932, page 591. It is conceded by all 
that the a~endment of 1~32, page 591, returns us to Acts of 
I i -
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.Assembly 1920, pag-e 256, except minor amendment as to 
medical which is not herein involved. Our Supreme Court 
of .Appeals has construed this section in Southern Ry. Co. v. 
Ur1,ited States Cas. Co., 136 Va. 475; 118 S. E. 266 .. Smith v. 
Virginia RY. Co., 144 Va. 91, 98; 135 S. E. 890. C. db O.' Ry. 
Co. v. Palmer, 1491 Va. 5·60, 573; 140 S. E. 831 These cases 
have ·been cited and ably discussed in Drinkard v. Drinkard-
Paytie B1tick Corp., No. 556-631, (to be print~d) by my col-
league Nickels, Commissioner. , 
It is the opinion that as a condition precedent to the em-
ployee's right to sue a third party a.fter he has accepted com-
pensation, he should call upon the employer or its carrier to , 
institute suit. If it refuses to institute suit or fails to do so 
within a reasonable period, the employee then unquestionably 
has the right to bring· suit. I think there is no law which re-
quires the employee to first eall upon the employer to sue. 
In C. d!; 0. Railway Co. v. Palmer, 149 Va. 560; 140 S. E. 831, 
the Court of .Appeals indicated that normally the suit is 
brought by the employer. The court said tha.t if the employer 
did -not care to avail itself of its rights under the statute, 
it could not defeat the rights of the employee. 
-page 12 ~ Neither that opinion nor any other one states what 
the employee must do before bringing suit. The 
employee has instituted an action against the third party, 
lost it, an~ is now claiming compensation. The employee in 
such a case should be estopped or otherwise precluded from 
claiming· compensation as he has defeated the employer's right 
of subrogation. In the Palmer c.ase, supra, the court said 
that the fi.rst paragraph of the statute merely prevented an 
employee from suing· his employer in an action at law. The 
second paragraph of the section was added to protect a.n in-
nocent employer who might be required to pay compensation. 
It gave to the employer the rig·ht to recover from the wrong-
doer whatever he had actually had to pay and took from the 
employee the right to a double recovery. However, Section 
12 gives the injured claimant the legal right to all sums the 
employer may recover against the negligent third party, in 
excess of those to which he is entitled to reimbursement. The 
·claimant in· the compensation case has a. pro tanto interest. 
in the· civil action to the extent that an excess recovery be-
longs to him. 
The second para.graph states that the making of a lawful 
claim against an employer for compensation shall operate 
as an assignment to the employer of the rights which the em-
ployee had against the third party and said employer shall 
be subrogated, etc. It seems to be, therefore, that the em-
ployer has certain rights against the third party. He, how-
.r2 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
ever, has only such rig·hts as the empfoyee has and if the em-
ployee has lost those rights, for example, by instituting suit 
-against the tort feasor and losing it, he has nothing· to assign 
. to the employer. · In such an event it certainly seems to me 
that an ordinary principles of justice the employee should not· 
. · be permitted to claim compensation after he has 
page 13 ~ lost his suit against the tort feasor. 
A discussion of election of remedies is in 18 Am . 
• Tur. 128 et seq. In order for the doctrine to apply, the fol-
lowing elements must exist: 
(1) The existence of two or more remedies; 
( 2) An inconsistency between remedies ; and 
( 3) A choice of one of t?em. 
The statement is made on page 137 that in that -class of 
case in which the remedies are not inconsistent but are altema-
tive and concurrent, there is no bar until one of them has 
been prosecuted to judgment unless the plaintiff has gained 
an advantage or the defendant has suffered a disadvantage. 
The statement is made that in some of the cases in this class 
it has been dete:rmined that there is no estoppel until satis-. 
faction has been obtained. Numerous authorities are cited 
in support of the latter proposition, including P1ttnami v. 
Ford, 155: Va. 625 ; 155 S. E. 823; 71 A. L. R. 1217. Although 
the opinion contains a statement from Ruling Case Law to 
that effect, the decision does not decide the matter. 
The later case of Pollard <t Bagby v. Thalhimer, 169 Va. 
529; 194 S. E. 701, the subject of election of remedies is dis .. · 
cussed in some detail. 
If the rem·edies are inconsistent, a failure to secure satis-
faction does not take the case out of the doctrine of election. 
18 .Am. Jur. 144. 
The opinion is that the action· o:r the claimant has destroyed 
the employer's right of subrogation against the third party 
and that consequently compensation should not be awarded. 
The general rule is that ignorance of material 
page 14 ~ facts prevents the doctrine of election from apply-
ing even though the remedies a.re inconsistent. · 
But. ignorance of facts will ~ot-relieve against an election of 
remedies where such relief would injure an innocent party. 
18 Am. Jur. 146 .. The author states that this rule has found 
application in cases where an innocent third party would be 
deprived of its right of subrogation if the election of remedies 
made under a mistake of fact were noi: held to be conclusive. 
The case of Employers Indemnity Corp. v. Felter (Texas), 
277 S. W. 376, is cit~d in support of the proposition. ';rhat 
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is an interesting decision.. Some yea:rs after an accident in. 
volving the death of an employee in the c.ourse of his employ-
ment, a suit instituted by his widow was decided. ad-vereely 
to her . .A claim. was then made for compensation and it was 
awarded. The compensation insurance carrier instituted suit 
to set aside the award on the ground that it had been de-
prived of its right of subrogation. The compensation. act 
in express terms required an election, but provided,· as does 
the Virginia Act, that any excess recovery by the employer 
or carrier went to1 the employee. The Texas Appellate Court 
decided the case in favor of the compensation earrier. It ap-
peared in that case that the widow was, ignorant of the £act 
that her husband's employer carried. compensation insur:.. 
ance. The court held tha.t that fact was immaterial when her 
act, i. e., losing the suit against the tort- feasor, deprived the 
compensation carrier of its valuable right of subrogation. I 
believe that the· same conclusion should be reached under the 
Virginia statute. . 
_There is also an annotation in 116 A. L. R. 604, in regard to 
election of' remedies· involving difierent parties~ 
page 15.} The argument is made that actually the com-
pensation ca.rri.er has not been prejudiced because 
the tort feasor is insolvent. I do not consider that arg-ument 
sound because it is the right of subrogation, not the result~ 
in a particular case that is important. The tort action went 
to judgment a.nd I think that should be a de:fi!nite election on 
the part of the employee. 
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF VIRGINIA 
RICHMOND 
NOTICE OF A WARD 
Claim No. 525-567 
Case of: Nathaniel Noblin 
Date: May 19th, 1942. 
To: Randolph Corporation, J. L. Rarden, Lessee; (Employer) 
South Boston, Virginia. 
•,', 
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I 
and: Nathaniel Noblin (Claimant)· Spring Street, 1Soutb Bo.s-
ton, Va. 
and: Virginia Auto Mutual Insurance Company, (Insurance 
Carrier) Brookland Park Boulevard and Hanes Ave-
. · ·nue, :&ichmond, Virginia. 
],.: Ci .Bedinger, Attorney R Boydton, Virginia . 
.Allen. 1·and Allen, Attorneys R Richmond, Virginia. 
Tuck~ Mitchell, Attorneys R South Hill, Virginia. . 
Simpkins and Young, Attorneys, Richmond, Virginia. 
You are hereby notified that a hearing was held in the above 
styled claim before Deans, Commissioner, at South Boston, 
Virginia, on March 19th, 1942, and a decision rendered on 
May 19, 1942, directing that this claim be dismissed on the 
ground the employee elected to make his claim against the 
third party and is, therefore, barred from making a claim 
against ~is employer for compensation bene~ts. · 
Attest: 
INDUSTRIAL COMM]SSION OF VIRGINIA 
W. F. ROBINSON 
Chairman. 
W. F. BURSEY, 
Secretary. 
page 17 ~ Nathaniel Noblin, Claimant 
v. 
Randolph Corporation, J. 0. Rarden, Lessee, Employer· 
Virginia .Auto Mutual Insurance Company, Insurer. 
Claim No. 525-567' 
July loth, 1942. 
Allen & Allen, Richmond, Virginia, for the Claimant. 
May, Simpkins & Young, Richmond, Virginia, for the de-
fendant. 
Review before the full Commission at Richmond, Virginia, 
.June 1, 1942. 
Robinson, Chairman, rendered the opinion. 
I. 
I 
Nathaniel Noblin v, Uandolph Oorporation, et al. as 
The full Commission, upon review, affirms the Findings of 
:h,act and award entered herein by Commissioner Deans, on 
the 19th day of May, 1942. · 
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INDUSTRIAL COMMI1SSION OF VIRGINIA 
RICHMOND 
NOTICE OF A WARD 
Claim No. 525-567 
Case of: Nathaniel Noblin 
To: Randolph Corporation, J. L. Rarden, Lessee, (Em-
ployer) South Boston, Virginia, 
and: Mr. Nathaniel Noblin, (Claimant) Spring· Street, South , 
Boston, Va. 
and: Virginia Auto Mutual Insurance Co. (Insurance Car-
rier) Brookland Park ijoulevard and Hanes Avenue, 
Richmond, Virginia. 
Allen & Allen, Attorneys R Richmond, Virginia. 
May, Simpkins & Young, Attys. R Mutual Building, Rich-
mond, Virginia. 
You are herebv notified that a review before the full Com-
mission was held in the above styled case at Richmond, Vir-
ginia, on June 1, 1942, and .a decision rendered on July 10th, 
1942, adopti~ the findings of fact and conclusions of law of 
the hearing uommissioner as the findings of fact and conclu-
sion of law of the full Commission, and affirming in ~11 re~ 
spects the award issued thereon. 
Attest: 
INDUST'RIAL OOMM1JSSION OF VIRGINIA 
W. F. ROBINSON 
Chairman. 
W. F. BURSEY, 
Secretary. 
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I, W. F. Bursey, .Secretary, Industrial Commission of Vir-
ginia, do hereby certify that the foregoing; according to the 
records of this office, is a true and ·correct copy of the state-
ment of findings of· fact, conclusions of law, and such other 
matters pertinent to the question at issue in Claim No. 525-
.567, Nathaniel Noblin (Employee) v. Randolph Corporation, 
J. L. Rarden, Lessee (Employer), and Virginia Auto Mutual 
Insurance Company (Insurance Carrier). · 
I, W. F. Bursey, S~cretary, as aforesaid, do further certify 
that counsel representing the employer and insurance carrier 
had due notice, before this transcript was made out and de-
livered, of the intention of counsel for the employee to ap-
ply for said transcript. . 
I, W. F. Bursey, Secretary, as aforesaid, do further certify 
that counsel representing the claimant, as evidence by U. S. 
Postal Registry Return Receipt card, received under date 
of July 11th, 1942, a copy of the award of the Industrial Com-
mission of Virginia, dated July 10th, 1942. 
Given under my hand and seal of tl1e Industrial Commis-
sion of Virginia this 16th day of July, 1942. 
W. F. BURSEY, 
(Seal) 
. Secretary 
Industrial Commission of Virginia. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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